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The Hart-Devlin debate centres upon the strongly contested issue of whether or not the law 
should enforce morality. The debate between these two figures was sparked by the 
Wolfenden Report of 1957, which concluded that due to the importance of individual 
freedom, ‘there must remain a realm of private morality which is, in brief and crude terms, 
not the law’s business’.1 The progression of our society into a more liberal entity has led to 
the argument that Hart, widely regarded as the twentieth century’s greatest British legal 
philosopher,2 has ultimately superseded Devlin in this debate. Therefore, this essay shall re-
examine each side of the debate in light of the changing legal landscape, specifically with 
reference to the public opinion on legalising euthanasia. The examination will seek to 
determine whether Hart’s liberal approach has in fact prevailed, or whether society is more 
inclined to accept the more conservative approach advocated by Devlin.  
 
The article which is examined in this essay puts forward the arguments for and against 
legalising euthanasia, with the author evidently being opposed to such a measure. In order to 
apply Devlin and Hart’s theories to this issue, a prudent starting point would be to consider 
their respective views on morality. Devlin believed that a recognised morality was 
fundamental for society’s existence.3 This emphasis on morality links Devlin to the naturalist 
tradition which dictates that laws must have certain requirements, deemed the ‘inner 
morality of law’, in order to command fidelity to them.4 Devlin suggested that even 
immoralities which prima facie cause no harm, do in fact cause harm in the sense that the 
moral offender may weaken the moral bonds that act as society’s cement. Furthermore, he 
argued that this effect would be exacerbated if the law did not intervene in such behaviour, 
                                                          
1 Wolfenden Committee, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (Cmnd 
247,1957) para 61. 
2 Gregory Bassham, ‘Legislating Morality: Scoring the Hart-Devlin Debate after Fifty Years’ (2012) 
25(2) Ratio Juris 117,121. 
3 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (OUP 1965) 11. 
4 Lon Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Hart’ (1958) 71 HLR 630, 645.  
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because citizens may perceive this to be the law condoning vice. A useful analogy is to 
consider society’s moral code like a house of cards, so removing one or two of these vital 
cards would result in the whole structure collapsing.5 Devlin proposed this as a justification 
for the enforcement of morality through the law, ‘society may use the law to preserve 
morality in the same way as it uses it to safeguard anything else that is essential to its 
existence’.6 Likewise, Hart acknowledged that some ‘universal values’ must exist if society is 
to survive, e.g. there must be laws restricting violence, theft and deception.7  
 
However aside from these universal values, referred to as the ‘minimum content of natural 
law’,8 Hart did not believe that society must have a consensus on every aspect of morality. 
Indeed, Hart recognised that pluralistic, multi-cultural societies may contain a variety of moral 
views.9 In addition, Hart suggests that even if society does have a shared morality, the 
existence of such society is not dependent on protecting these moral values. Although Devlin 
states ‘history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of 
disintegration’10 he offers no further elaboration on this point. Therefore, Hart critiques 
Devlin for proffering no empirical evidence to support his assumption that ‘a change in 
[society’s] morality is tantamount to the destruction of a society’.11 In fact, Hart suggests that 
there is more evidence to the contrary. He argues that morality is not a single seamless web 
and therefore we can reject part of it, yet adhere just as strongly to the rest.12 For example, 
within the European countries which have decriminalised homosexual conduct, there has 
been no evidence of any major social or moral disintegration, which Devlin prophesised, 
despite strong public disapproval of such conduct.13 Therefore, the crux of the disagreement 
turns on whether or not one believes in social contamination from laxness in one kind of 
standard, to laxness in others.14 
                                                          
5 Bassham (n 2) 119. 
6 Devlin (n 3) 11. 
7 Michael Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) 346. 
8 James William Harris, Legal Philosophies (2nd edn, Butterworths 1997) 140. 
9 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory (3rd edn, OUP 
2012) 36. 
10 Devlin (n 3) 13. 
11 HLA Hart, Law Liberty and Morality (Stanford University Press 1963) 51. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 52.  However note, some would argue that the lack of homogeneity in the UK is evidence of 
such social or moral disintegration.  
14 Harris (n 8) 141. 
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Devlin’s views on morality resound within the article, as the author warns of the ‘slippery 
slope’ which may result from legalising euthanasia. She refers to The Netherlands as an 
illustration of this point, where the legalisation of euthanasia has led to this measure 
becoming available to children.15 This in turn could address Hart’s criticism regarding the lack 
of evidence in support of Devlin’s assumption. On the contrary, it may be argued that this 
only shows the effect which legalising euthanasia has in terms of the broadening of 
euthanasia itself, it does not suggest that allowing euthanasia will erode other areas of 
established morality within society. Therefore, it does not address Hart’s criticisms of the 
aspect of Devlin’s theory which Hart termed ‘the disintegration thesis’.16 Using the example 
outlined above, if decriminalising homosexual conduct has not led to the collapse of society, 
as Devlin feared, what basis is there for arguing that legalising euthanasia would produce this 
effect? 
 
In any event, the disagreement is relieved to a certain extent by Devlin’s response to Hart, ‘I 
do not assert that any deviation from a society’s shared morality threatens its existence…I 
assert that [it is] capable…of threatening the existence of society so that neither can be put 
beyond the law.’17 This qualifies Devlin’s argument, limiting it to the contention that we 
cannot outright ban the law from enforcing public morality because the challenge to 
established morality may be so profound as to threaten the very existence of society.18 This 
re-formulation of Devlin’s argument can be viewed as an acceptance by Devlin that morality 
can change over time and hence not every deviation from morality is a challenge to society. 
Therefore, the real area for dispute turns upon when exactly the law should intervene; how 
profound does the challenge to morality have to be?  
 
                                                          
15 Margaret Somerville, ‘Legalising assisted dying would be a failure of collective human memory and 
imagination’ The Guardian (London, 20 September 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/20/legalising-assisted-dying-would-be-a-
failure-of-collective-human-memory-and-imagination> accessed 27 March 2018. 
16 Hamish Stewart, ‘Legality and Morality in H.L.A Hart’s Theory of Criminal Law’ (1999) 52 SMU Law 
Review 201,215. ‘Disintegration thesis’ cited in HLA Hart, Law Liberty and Morality (Stanford 
University Press 1963) 50. 
17 Devlin (n 3) 13. 
18 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (New impression with a reply to critics, Duckworth 2004) 
244. 
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In order to formulate an answer to this question, it is fundamental to consider the views 
expressed by Mill, which predated both Hart and Devlin’s theories.  At the core of Mill’s theory 
is the harm principle he devised. This proposed that ‘the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant’.19 Mill 
came to be viewed as the apostle of the ‘permissive society’ 20 and his views can be seen to 
influence the Wolfenden report, which declared that living off the earnings of prostitutes was 
to remain an offence, since this involves exploitation, which the harm principle warrants 
punishing.21  In terms of this exploitation, Mill’s harm principle can thus be used to justify the 
argument against legalising euthanasia. This is because the article forebodes that ‘early 
inheritance syndrome’, (whereby a person uses a power of attorney to access an elderly 
person’s financial assets for their own benefit), would morph into an ‘early death syndrome’ 
if euthanasia were to be legalised.22 Devlin and Hart’s views on the harm principle shall be 
discussed in turn, in order to determine their opinions on when the law should intervene and 
whether legalising euthanasia would come within the scope for intervention.  
 
Devlin fundamentally rejected the harm principle, he did not believe that an act must cause 
harm to some individual or group of persons before the law intervenes. His basic premise was 
that the criminal law is not just for the protection of individuals, but also for the protection 
of society.23  As a result, he thinks that the law should intervene when conduct arouses 
widespread ‘intolerance indignation and disgust’.24 He argued that this should be judged by 
reference to the ordinary man, i.e. the ‘man in the jury box’. On the one hand, this can be 
perceived as an adequate assessment because the jury does not give a snap judgement, its 
verdict should be based on argument, deliberation and guidance received from an 
experienced judge.25 Since Devlin apparently conceded to the view that society’s morality can 
change over time, it is arguable that the legalisation of euthanasia would be permitted under 
                                                          
19 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed, Penguin 1974) 68-69. 
20 Stephen Mavroghenis, ‘Mill’s Concept of Harm Redefined’ (1994) UCL Jurisprudence Review 155, 
157. 
21 Harris (n 8) 132. 
22 Euthanasia article (n 15).  
23 Peter Cane, ‘Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate’ (2006) 10 The 
Journal of Ethics 21, 22. 
24 Devlin (n 3) 17. 
25 Freeman (n 7) 344. 
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this assessment. This is because, if society is becoming more accepting of euthanasia, 
legalising it would be unlikely to invoke the ‘intolerance, indignation and disgust’ required for 
the law to intervene and prevent such action. This is particularly the case with passive 
euthanasia, involving the withdrawal of life-preserving treatment, as opposed to active 
euthanasia which requires positive steps to terminate life.26 
 
On the other hand, flaws can be exposed in the measure of society’s morality proposed by 
Devlin. For example, Dworkin exclaims ‘what is shocking and wrong is not [Devlin’s] idea that 
the community’s morality counts, but his idea of what counts as the community’s morality’.27 
Dworkin argues that we must distinguish opinions which are supported by moral reasons, 
from opinions which are based on prejudice, aversion or rationalisations (implausible 
propositions of fact). He argues that a legislator may take account of the former but must 
ignore the latter.28 Devlin himself stated that the ordinary man, or man in the jury box, whose 
opinion we must enforce ‘is not expected to reason about anything and his judgement may 
be largely a matter of feeling’.29 This is the complete antithesis to the above assertion that 
the man in the jury box would base his assessment on argument, deliberation and guidance. 
For Devlin, the reasons for moral condemnation are irrelevant, provided such condemnation 
exists, the act ought to be forbidden by law.30 Thus, there is a concern that allowing the 
ordinary man to be the ultimate arbitrator on issues of morality, without any qualification, 
has a frightening evocation to the Nazi regime.31 The article reinforces this point, by observing 
that the justification for the euthanasia program for people with ‘lives not worth living’ in the 
Holocaust, is ‘eerily similar to present justifications for euthanasia.’32 Therefore, whilst 
Devlin’s ‘man in the jury box’ may be a valid starting point by which to determine issues of 
morality, in order to guarantee that these decisions are reached systematically and not 
arbitrarily, it seems that such decisions must be subject to rational, critical appraisal. 
 
                                                          
26 Euthanasia article (n 15). 
27 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals’ (1966) 75 Yale LJ 986, 1001. 
28 Harris (n 8) 139. 
29 Devlin (n 3) 15. 
30 Robert George, ‘Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement of Morals: A Reconsideration of the 
Hart-Devlin Debate’ (1990) 35 American Journal of Jurisprudence 14, 19. 
31 Graham Hughes, ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’ (1962) 71 Yale LJ 662, 675-6. 
32 Euthanasia article (n 15). 
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Nonetheless, this concern is alleviated to some extent by certain principles which, according 
to Devlin, must be borne in mind when deciding whether legal intervention is necessary. 
These principles are: that there must be toleration of ‘the maximum individual freedom that 
is consistent with the integrity of society’; the legislators must keep in mind that the limits of 
tolerance shift; privacy should be respected as far as possible and the law is concerned with 
a minimum, not a maximum, standard of behaviour.33  Thus, these principles go some way to 
ensuring that the boundaries of an individual’s liberty are not unreasonably restricted. They 
ensure that public disapproval is only a necessary condition for legal enforcement, not a 
sufficient one, since such disapproval must also be aligned with these principles.34 
Additionally, the notion of the ‘man in the jury box’ deciding issues of morality is not entirely 
novel because the courts have recognised an offence of conspiring to corrupt public morals 
since 1962,35 which gives an important role to the moral opinion of juries. Similarly, the courts 
have held that the concept of ‘dishonesty’ employed by the Theft Act 1968 is not a term 
defined by the law, but is rather a concept which the jury must determine by reference to 
their own moral standards.36 
 
In regard to Hart, he extends Mill’s harm principle to also encompass paternalism.  This allows 
the law to intervene to prevent people from doing themselves physical harm and Hart favours 
this paternalist approach to that of legal moralism, the view that general agreement among 
members of society that conduct is immoral justifies legal prohibition.37 In respect of the 
necessary ‘harm’, Hart seeks to incorporate offence caused by some public act within the 
reach of the law.38 He makes a significant distinction between offence caused by some public 
display and offence caused by knowledge that certain things are done behind closed doors. 
He claims that the law cannot intervene in the latter instance because to do so ‘would be 
tantamount to punishing them simply because others object to what they do; and the only 
liberty which could coexist with this…is liberty to do those things to which no-one seriously 
                                                          
33 Devlin (n 3) 16-19. 
34 Bassham (n 2) 124. 
35 Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220; Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP [1973] AC 
435. 
36 R v Feely [1973] QB 530; R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053. 
37 Harris (n 8) 135. 
38 Stephen Mavroghenis, ‘Mill’s Concept of Harm Redefined’ (1994) UCL Jurisprudence Review 155, 
160. 
Volume 1 Issue 2 Student Journal of Professional Practice and Academic Research 
30 
Northumbria University – ISSN 2632-0452 – All content CC-BY 4.0 
objects’.39 This distinction between offence-through knowledge and offence-through 
witnessing was endorsed by the Williams Report of 1979.40 Nevertheless, for others the harm 
principle goes too far. For example, Feinberg cites the crimes of consensual sodomy and 
incest which, in the USA, have attracted sentences ranging from twenty years’ imprisonment 
to capital punishment. Since these are victimless crimes, he states that the penalty is 
presumably based on the assumed offensiveness of the behaviour, yet Feinberg maintains 
that causing offence is less serious than harming someone and therefore the sanctions should 
be less onerous.41 Consequently, from this perspective it would be necessary to have a 
distinction between how the law intervenes for acts which cause direct harm to someone, 
and acts which indirectly harm someone through causing offence. 
 
The distinction between the public and private sphere, advocated by Mill and Hart, has been 
questioned in terms of its viability. Stephen argued that the distinction was fallacious and 
nebulous and could not be maintained.42 Similarly, Nattrass claimed that if we follow Hart’s 
reasoning, we reach the ludicrous conclusion ‘…that it is morally preferable…for a man to beat 
his wife at home rather than in the street’.43 However, this assertion is flawed in that it 
concerns the infliction of harm on another individual, which therefore comes within the harm 
principle regardless of whether it was committed in public or private. Despite this, there is 
still a valid critique of the public and private sphere distinction, in the form of John Donne’s 
‘no man is an island’ proposition. This claims that any activity has an impact on someone else 
e.g. if one injures themselves through taking drugs, they cause harm to society in the form of 
the cost on the medical services.44 Therefore, private acts will always have repercussions on 
society, to one extent or another and this denies the plausibility of the argument that there 
can be distinct categories of activities committed in the public sphere, and those committed 
in private.  
 
                                                          
39 Hart (n 11) 47. 
40 Williams Committee, Report of the Committee on Obsenity and Film Censorship (Cmnd 7772, 
1979). 
41 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 1984) and Offense to 
Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 1985). 
42 James F Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, (Reprinted edition, Cambridge University Press, 
1967).   
43 Mark Nattrass, ‘Devlin, Hart and the Proper Limits of Legal Coercision’ (1993) 5 Utilitas 91, 101. 
44 Harris (n 8) 135-136. 
Volume 1 Issue 2 Student Journal of Professional Practice and Academic Research 
31 
Northumbria University – ISSN 2632-0452 – All content CC-BY 4.0 
Paternalists like Hart have traditionally opposed euthanasia, presumably on the grounds that 
nothing could be more harmful to you than dying.45 Hart’s concern with allowing euthanasia 
is not that society may view this as immoral, but rather that people may harm themselves if 
they make the wrong decision, e.g. consent may be given without adequate reflection or in 
circumstances where their judgement was clouded.46 However, this argument may be 
countered by the idea of subjective paternalism. This permits the law to intervene in 
preventing euthanasia, if there is a reasonable belief that the person denied this right will 
ultimately be pleased that such action was not taken. This would therefore prevent 
euthanasia’s scope from extending to those without terminal, debilitating illnesses, who may, 
for example, have recently experienced teenage heartbreak and believe that life can hold 
nothing for them.47 Nevertheless, this idea has been criticised ‘not one genuine justification 
for providing autonomy for some and not for others has or can be made…If assisted suicide 
was really a right, it should surely be accorded to all.’48 Similarly, it has been submitted that 
allowing doctors to determine the validity of euthanasia requests in this way, results in the 
individual’s supposed autonomy being made redundant.49 Thus, if the argument against 
subjective paternalism were to be espoused, it would be extremely difficult to argue that Hart 
would be in favour of legalising euthanasia in this unfettered form. 
 
Alternatively, Hart’s argument that no-one is bound to admit that the law may punish forms 
of immorality which involve no suffering, may be seen to provide a justification for the 
legalisation of euthanasia.50 This is because if we interpret this to be stating that the criminal 
law should be used to prevent suffering, legalising euthanasia is undoubtedly justified.51 
Therefore, the contradictory views which Hart puts forward in relation to euthanasia means 
that concluding on what side of the debate he would ultimately fall, is inevitably plagued with 
ambiguities. Despite this, it would seem that on balance, Hart would be more inclined to 
accept legalisation. This is because the potential harm of allowing euthanasia to those who 
                                                          
45 Christine Pierce, ‘Hart on Paternalism’ (1975) 35 OUP 205, 206. 
46 Hart (n 11) 32-33. 
47 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Euthanasia, Morality, and Law’ (1998) 31 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
1147, 1151-1152. 
48 Jonathon Herring, ‘Publication Review: Assisted Suicide, The Liberal Humanist Case Against 
Liberalization’ (2014) International Journal of Law in Context, 273 citing page 57 of the book. 
49 Hallvard Lillehammer, ‘Voluntary Euthanasia and the Logical Slippery Slope Argument’ (2002) 61 
Cambridge Law Journal 545, 546. 
50 Hart (n 11) 34. 
51 Pierce (n 45) 206. 
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desire it, is outweighed by the enduring pain and suffering which individuals would be 
subjected to if legalisation was not permitted. Additionally, the caveat to Mill’s harm principle 
enables the law to intervene to prevent children causing harm to themselves.52 Arguably, this 
addresses some of the concerns of those opposed to legalising euthanasia, as it would 
prevent the events cited in The Netherlands, namely the availability of euthanasia to children, 
from being lawful in our society. This, coupled with subjective paternalism, would limit the 
ambit of euthanasia, thus addressing Hart’s concerns that people may request euthanasia 
momentarily, or without due reflection, when they do not truly want it.  
 
Another aspect of this debate which causes disagreement amongst Hart and Devlin relates to 
the means of enforcement. Devlin believes that coercion should be used to enforce morality, 
yet Hart claims that there is ‘little evidence to support the idea that morality is best taught by 
fear of legal punishment’.53 Thus, Hart argues that if the threat of coercion does not compel 
people to behave morally, its justification can only be based upon the retributive theory of 
punishment.54 However, this theory of punishment is only valid where the crime has harmed 
others and thus, in the case of immoral victimless acts committed in private, it cannot be 
logically argued that punishment is still called for.55 This reflects the arguments cited by 
Feinberg, in relation to the crimes of consensual sodomy and incest. Additionally, Hart 
contends that enforcing morality by way of legal sanctions has the undesirable effect of 
curtailing the development of society’s moral code.56 Hart considers that if established 
morality is too stringently enforced, the opportunities to challenge an incorrect view of the 
majority would be removed and this could have detrimental effects, e.g. imagine if the 
monumental harms inflicted on Jews and other minorities by the Nazi regime were never 
challenged.57 For Hart, enforcing morality through coercion is wrong in the sense that the 
price in terms of human misery and loss of freedom is too high.58 This is clearly demonstrated 
in the case of euthanasia, because if this is not legalised, those individuals will be forced to 
                                                          
52 Mill (n 19) 68-69. 
53 Hart (n 11) 58. 
54 JG Riddall, Jurisprudence (2nd edn, OUP 1999) 310. 
55 Hart (n 11) 60. 
56 Ibid pg 69-71. 
57 Thomas Peterson, ‘New Legal Moralism: Some Strengths and Challenges’ (2010) 4 Criminal Law 
and Philosophy 215, 218. 
58 Hart (n 11) 83. 
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experience the enduring misery of their physical condition and would arguably feel robbed of 
their ability to determine their own life.  
 
Consequently, Hart believes that the more appropriate means of ensuring that members of 
society adhere to its moral code, is through discussion, advice and argument.59 Hart’s 
reluctance to enforce morality by legal coercion demonstrates his ties to the positivist 
approach. Positivism states that the individual must choose whether to disobey immoral laws 
and suffer the consequences and therefore under this approach, it is more likely that legal 
intervention on issues of morality will be restricted.60 However, an alternative understanding 
is that the typical law-abiding citizen chooses to obey the law not to avoid its legal sanctions, 
but because they consider it the right thing to do. In this case, legal intervention for issues of 
morality may be regarded as necessary, to ensure the preferred course of action in relation 
to a particular matter is taken, rather than being viewed as a violation of individuals’ 
autonomy.61 However, even if this was the case, it is still unlikely that such a justification could 
be used against legalising euthanasia. This is because the majority opinion, particularly after 
consideration of concepts such as ‘subjective paternalism’, would be unlikely to believe that 
the law’s intervention in order to prevent such a measure, would be the preferred course of 
action. 
 
In conclusion, upon examination it is evident that the question as to whether Hart or Devlin’s 
views would prevail in relation to legalising euthanasia is not as clear cut as it may initially 
appear. Although it is unlikely that such a measure would now invoke the ‘widespread 
intolerance, indignation and disgust’ required to prevent such action according to Devlin, 
issues still arise on the application of Hart’s theory. This is because, if we take Hart to accept 
the legalisation of euthanasia, on the basis that preventing it would ultimately cause more 
harm to the individual, questions arise in relation to ascertaining an acceptable ambit of 
euthanasia. In other words, what conditions must be fulfilled in order for a person to be 
legally entitled to it. A sensible approach may be to determine society’s moral views on this 
question and this resonates back to Devlin’s ‘intolerance, indignation and disgust’ 
                                                          
59 JG Riddall, Jurisprudence (2nd edn, OUP 1999) 311. 
60 H.L.A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 HLR 593, 620. 
61 Peter Cane, ‘Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debat’e (2006) 10 The 
Journal of Ethics 21, 45. 
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assessment. Thus, it has been argued that liberals such as Hart, who support limited 
paternalism, abandon the ground of legal intervention resting on individual complaint and 
once this occurs, the extension to legal moralism seems perfectly plausible.62 This in turn 
suggests that Devlin’s theory has not been entirely disregarded, but rather it provides a useful 
tool in remedying the uncertainties which result from attempts to align Hart’s theory to the 
arguments for legalising euthanasia. Thus, whilst Hart’s liberal approach does seem to have 
prevailed in relation to legalising euthanasia, Devlin’s theory may provide useful assistance in 
determining its scope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality’ (1999) 40 William and 
Mary Law Review 927, 942. 
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